Touro Law Review
Volume 33

Number 3

Article 14

2017

Finding a Fair Balance for the Right of Publicity and First
Amendment Protections
Christine DiGregorio

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
DiGregorio, Christine (2017) "Finding a Fair Balance for the Right of Publicity and First Amendment
Protections," Touro Law Review: Vol. 33: No. 3, Article 14.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/14

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center. For
more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

DiGregorio: The Right of Publicity

FINDING A FAIR BALANCE FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
AND FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
Christine DiGregorio *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Today’s society is consumed with the lives of celebrities and
incorporates them as an important part of modern everyday life. Many
individuals today “keep up” with the Kardashians as much as they keep
up with the lives of their personal friends. 1 A contestant on “The
Bachelor” or “The Voice” is now a household name with whom some
fans feel a personal connection. 2 As a result, a celebrity’s identity
pervades and influences our culture.
Celebrities have even become prominent in political and
societal movements. For example, the attendance of Beyoncé, Katy
Perry and many others at the Second Inauguration of former President
Barack Obama was highly publicized. 3 More recently, the revelation
*

J.D. Candidate 2017, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; Bachelor of Science
2014, State University of New York at Albany. I would like to thank my Mom and Dad for
their endless love, moral support, and encouragement throughout my entire law school career;
and my brothers, Danny and Brian, who always lifted my spirits at times when I was too
stressed to do so on my own. Additionally, I would like to thank all my close family and
friends who have extended words of encouragement and support throughout my time at law
school. You truly motivated and inspired me to get through some of the longest days and
nights. Finally, I would like to thank Professor Rena Seplowitz for her guidance and
invaluable insight throughout the writing process of this comment.
1 Keeping up with the Kardashians June 4, 2013 premiere averaged three million viewers.
The Kardashians Still Going Strong in Season 8, LIVE JOURNAL (June 4, 2013),
http://ohnotheydidnt.livejournal.com/78395171.html.
2 Millions of viewers express their opinions on social media each time the show is aired
about the contestants on reality TV shows such as “Keeping up with the Kardashians,”
“American Idol,” and “The Voice.” See, e.g., Weekly Top Ten, NIELSEN SOCIAL,
http://www.nielsensocial.com/nielsentwittertvratings/weekly (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
3 Kelly Clarkson, Jamie Fox and John Legend all performed at the inauguration.
Additionally, rapper Jay-Z, singer John Mayer, actress Eva Longoria, and actor Mario Lopez
were in attendance. Celebrities of President Barack Obama’s Second Inauguration, SF GATE
(Jan. 21, 2013), http://blog.sfgate.com/politics/2013/01/21/celebrities-of-president-barackobama’s-second-inauguration-with-photo-gallery/.
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by Caitlyn Jenner 4 has paved the way for the acceptance of transgender
individuals in both society and professional sports. 5 Kanye West’s
whirlwind announcement of his run for presidency in 2020 at the MTV
Video Music Awards 6 threw society into a frenzy. 7 The cultural and
political influences of these household names demonstrate how
celebrities have developed into more than figures of entertainment.
These famous individuals are just a few of the celebrities who
have extended their influence in areas far beyond the entertainment
field. 8 Many people duplicate diets of celebrities, 9 and even follow
celebrities’ suggestions on Instagram 10 posts, dining at places that they
believe the celebrity had visited. 11 It is no wonder that so many
commercial retailers, business owners, and restaurant owners desire a
celebrity’s endorsement for their products.
However, it is precisely the celebrities’ influence that
reinforces the importance of their right of publicity in their own
4

Caitlyn, formerly Bruce Jenner, revealed in an exclusive interview with Diane Sawyer that
she was a transgendered woman, and after years of hiding her real identity, would be making
the change to a woman. Transcript of Bruce Jenner Coming Out as Transgender Will Only
Make You Respect Jenner More, BUSTLE (Apr. 24, 2014).
http://www.bustle.com/articles/78832-transcript-of-bruce-jenner-coming-out-astransgender-will-only-make-you-respect-jenner-more. See also Bruce Jenner - The Interview,
ABC (July 15, 2015) http://abc.go.com/shows/2020/listing/2015-04/24-bruce-jenner-theinterview.
5 Caitlyn Jenner was awarded the Arthur Ashe Courage Award at the 2015 ESPYS. Caitlyn
Jenner Accepts Arthur Ashe Courage Award, ESPN (July 16, 2015),
http://espn.go.com/espys/2015/story/_/id/13264599/caitlyn-jenner-accepts-arthur-ashecourage-award-espys-ashe2015.
6 Kanye West Declares 2020 Presidency vid at VMAs, CNN (Sept. 5, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/31/politics/kanye-west-2020-running-for-president-vma/.
7 See, e.g., This is How Twitter Wants Kayne West’s Presidential Dream to Unfold!, DNA
INDIA (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.dnaindia.com/entertainment/report-this-is-how-twitterwants-kanye-west-s-presidential-dream-to-unfold-2120971.
8 See supra notes 1-7.
9 5 Healthy Celebs – And How to Eat Like Them, PEOPLE (Dec. 12, 2013),
http://greatideas.people.com/2013/12/30/5-healthy-celebs-and-how-to-eat-like-them/.
10 Instagram is a social media site where members of society post pictures of their everyday
lives. An individual can “like” a picture that someone else posts, to represent his approval or
support of the photo. A Quick Overview of Instagram, BUSINESS PRODUCTIVITY (Sept. 10,
2012), https://www.instagram.com.
11 See, e.g., jonathancheban, INSTAGRAM, https://instagram.com/p/BB5JBC3j6tx/ (last
visited Mar. 7, 2017). Celebrity Jonathan Cheban – known for being best friends with the
Kardashian sisters – posted a picture of a milkshake from Black Tap Craft Burgers and Beer
in New York City. The picture has over 16,000 likes, meaning that over 16,000 people saw
the picture and now know where to find a milkshake exactly like the one that Jonathan posted.
Id.
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identity. The right of publicity is an intellectual property right that
enables celebrities to control the use of their identities and prohibit
their unauthorized use. 12 The difference between a celebrity
endorsement of a commercial product 13 and the exploitation of a
celebrity’s identity for commercial benefit 14 is crucial. The celebrity
must be protected from pirates of his identity; however, this protection
must also be limited because he is not entitled to a monopoly in his
identity. Many intellectual property rights have been established as a
way of promoting science and fostering creation of ideas. 15
Accordingly, the right of publicity protection must stay true to this
intellectual property law foundation, and not hinder creativity.
Problems arise when the right of publicity is invoked in forms of
expression that can also fall under the First Amendment free speech
protection, and thus a proper balance between the two important
protections must be determined.
This comment argues that the best way to resolve the ongoing
conflict of balancing the First Amendment and right of publicity
protections is with a modified fair use defense, that utilizes both the
copyright fair use doctrine and the Federal Lanham Act fair use
defense in its analysis. Section II provides a background of the right
of publicity and its increasing expansion. Section III reviews the
balancing tests that are currently applied in the Circuit Courts and
points out the problems with the tests. Section IV compares copyright
12 The right of publicity prohibits the appropriation of “the commercial value of a person’s
identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indica of identity for
the purposes of trade.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995); see also
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West) (prohibiting “using another’s name, voice, or likeness, in any
manner or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or
soliciting purchases of products, merchandise, goods, or services.”). Generally, the right of
publicity protects the “commercial use” of the name, image or likeness. See J. Thomas
McCarthy, 1 THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 3.2 (West) (describing that “what is
required is proof that the defendant intended to obtain a commercial advantage.”).
13 Celebrity
Endorsements,
ADWEEK,
http://www.adweek.com/topic/celebrityendorsements (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
14 Michael Jordan was successful in his claim against the Chicago-based super market chain
Dominick’s for using his name and promoting a product without his permission. Supermarket
(Aug.
22,
2015),
Chain
Pay
Michael
Jordan,
ESPN
http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/13486052/supermarket-chain-pay-michael-jordan-89million-use-name
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 8 (stating that the purpose of Congress is “to promote the progress
of science and useful arts”). See also White v. Samsung Elec. Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513-16
(9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasizing that
“intellectual property rights aren’t free: they’re imposed at the expense of future creators and
of the public at large;” and that “creativity is impossible without a rich public domain.”).
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law with the right of publicity, and examines the Fair Use Doctrine as
used in copyright law. Section V delineates the proposed new Right
of Publicity Defense to be used in right of publicity cases. Finally,
Section VI analyzes two cases under the new proposed balancing test
exemplifying the compelling justification for the new defense.
II.

THE BIRTH OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AS
RIGHT OF PRIVACY

The right of publicity originated in the right of privacy, which
stems from “the right to be left alone.” 16 In 1890, Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis published The Right to Privacy, which has since been
deemed one of the most influential law review articles in history, and
planted the seed for the right of publicity. 17 Warren and Brandeis
argued that the law already established a need for a right of privacy,
and that this privacy included the right to life and the right to enjoy
life. 18 Thus, in their influential article, they expanded these rights, and
interpreted the right to life and the right to enjoy life as a right to be
left alone, 19 better known as a right to privacy. At the time of the
seminal article, changes in society had created a need for a privacy
right. 20 Unauthorized intrusion into one’s private life offered no
recourse, and although not every state was quick to adopt the common
law right of privacy, 21 this need for protection and a right to recover
from this nonconsensual intrusive disclosure of personal information

16 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
17 Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203
(1954).
18 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 193-96.
19 Michael Schoenberger, Unnecessary Roughness: Reconciling Hart and Keller with a
Fair Use Standard Benefitting the Right of Publicity, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1875, 1879-80 (2013)
(quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
193 (1890)); see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“[The Founders] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let
alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”).
20 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 16, at 195-96 (emphasizing that the invention of new
mechanisms like the instantaneous photo and the methods of the news media created a need
for a protection of private lives).
21 The New York Court of Appeals originally rejected the adoption of a common law right
of privacy. See Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 443 (N.Y. 1902),
superseded by statute, N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50, § 51 (Consol. 2001 & Supp. 2005).
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and pictures led to many states recognizing a common law right of
privacy. 22
This right of privacy still made it difficult for celebrities to
recover for damage as a result of infringement of their image, since
many courts were unsympathetic to their claim, holding that a
celebrity’s lifestyle diminished her rights to privacy. 23 Consequently,
celebrities sought a way to protect themselves against the unauthorized
commercial use of their images and likeness. 24 The Second Circuit
first addressed this concern in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc. 25 In that case, the court held that a professional
baseball player not only had a right of privacy, but also had a right of
publicity for the value of his photographs used by a gum
manufacturer. 26 Judge Jerome Frank, writing for the court, recognized
that “[i]n addition to and independent of the right of privacy, a man has
a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant
the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture.” 27
Following this case, two influential law review articles
expanded and solidified the justification for the right of publicity.
First, Melville Nimmer expanded on the Warren-Brandeis privacy
essay, and reiterated the inadequacy of available legal protections for
celebrities to avoid the unauthorized commercial exploitation of their
identities. 28 Additionally, Nimmer noted that an individual invests a
great deal of time, effort, and skill in order to obtain a publicly desired

22 As a result of the article written by Warren & Brandeis, fifteen states adopted a common
law right of privacy: Alabama, Arizona, California, Georgia, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, and Pennsylvania.
Nimmer, supra note 17, at 203 nn.3-4.
23 O’Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167, 170 (holding that a professional football player
could not claim damages under privacy law for the unauthorized use of his picture in a beer
advertisement since he is not a private person); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc.,
24 F. Supp. 1004, 1007-09 (W.D. Okla. 1938) (finding that Paramount celebrities waived their
right to privacy and the defendant could sell posters with their names and photographs without
their permission), rev’d on other grounds, 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939); Pallas v. Crowley
Milner & Co., 54 N.W.2d at 596-97 (holding that plaintiff model waived her rights of privacy
and could not recover because she was a public figure).
24 See generally Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1953).
25 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
26 Id. at 869.
27 Id. at 868.
28 Nimmer, supra note 17, at 216.
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status, 29 and that accordingly, “every person is entitled to the fruits of
their labors.” 30
Moreover, in 1960 William Prosser expanded on the right of
privacy and categorized it into four distinct torts: intrusion to solitude,
public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, false light in the public
eye, and appropriation of one’s name and likeness for the defendant’s
advantage. 31 Prosser defined his fourth category as a “defendant
making use of the name to pirate the plaintiff’s identity for some
advantage of his own;” 32 this later became known as the right of
publicity. 33
Further, in 1977, the Supreme Court, in its only decision
addressing the right of publicity, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 34 acknowledged the right of publicity as a state law
cause of action, 35 but did not define its scope. As a result, while most
states recognize the right of publicity either via case law, statute, or
both, 36 the scope varies from state to state. 37
A.

Expanding the Scope of the Right of Publicity and
the First Amendment Implications
1.

The Scope of the Right of Publicity

The scope of the right of publicity extends far beyond the
protection of the mere image of a celebrity. Courts have extended the

29

Id.
Id.
31 William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
32 Id. at 403.
33 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983). See
also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563 (1977).
34 433 U.S. 562, 567 (1977).
35 Id. at 566.
36 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 10:7 (stating that “courts have uniformly held that the
right of publicity is a property right.”).
37 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc. 717 F.3d 141, 152 (3d Cir. 2013) (recognizing that Zacchini “is
the only supreme court case addressing the First Amendment in a right of publicity context.”).
Some states recognize the right of publicity as a property right, acknowledging that an
individual’s identity is her own property, which she is free to control as she wants. Moreover,
other states recognize the right of publicity more narrowly as a privacy right. MCCARTHY,
supra note 12, at § 6:3; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West) (expressly prohibiting “using
another’s name, voice, or likeness,” and protecting it as a publicity right; but see NEB. REV.
STAT. § 20-202 (West) (protecting an unwanted use of a name or likeness as a “privacy” right).
30

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/14

6

DiGregorio: The Right of Publicity

2017

THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

1001

right to objects such as racecars, 38 slogans such as “The Greatest,” 39
and even catch phrases such as “Here’s Johnny.” 40 One significant
demonstration of a broad interpretation of right of publicity protection
was White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc.. 41 In that case, the Ninth Circuit
held that the use of a robot in a Samsung commercial dressed similarly
to the celebrity television personality, Vanna White, was a violation of
White’s right of publicity. 42 The advertisement contained an image of
a robot wearing a wig, gown, and jewelry, which were all used to
resemble Vanna White’s attire on the television show. 43 In addition to
the similarities in physical appearance, the robot was also posed next
to a game board which was undeniably recognizable as the Wheel of
Fortune game show set, in a way that White was infamously known to
do. 44 The court emphasized that the more popular a celebrity becomes,
the easier it is to evoke her identity without resorting to the obvious
means such as name, likeness, or voice; 45 and therefore, the identities
of the most popular celebrities are the most attractive for advertisers
and should be afforded ample protection. 46
The need to balance the right of publicity with the First
Amendment was evident to Judge Alcaron, who emphasized the need
to ensure that protection of the creators of intellectual property should
not hinder the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First
Amendment. 47 Additionally, he acknowledged the important role the
courts play balancing these competing interests when necessary. 48
38 Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that
the use of a white pinstripe on a red race car in a commercial, without an actual picture of the
plaintiff, violated the plaintiff’s right of publicity because these objects were identifying
characteristics that implied the plaintiff’s likeness and therefore constituted an unauthorized
commercial use of his identity).
39 Ali v. Playgirl Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that captioning a
drawing of a nude boxer in the magazine as “the Greatest” sufficiently identified Ali as the
implied character in the picture and therefore invaded his right of publicity).
40 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding
that the use of the phrase “Here’s Johnny” for the portable toilet company was an infringement
of Carson’s right of publicity because the phrase was broadly associated with Carson and was
part of his identity).
41 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1396.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1408 (Alcaron, J., dissenting).
46 White, 971 F.2d at 1408 (Alcaron, J., dissenting).
47 Id. (Alcaron, J., dissenting).
48 Id. (Alcaron, J., dissenting).
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Moreover, Judge Kozinski in his dissent to the denial of rehearing
White warned of the risks of overprotecting the right of publicity. 49 He
emphasized that a rich public domain was essential for creativity, and
cautioned “overprotection stifles the very creative forces it’s supposed
to nurture.” 50
With such a broad interpretation of the publicity right, it was
inevitable that conflicts with other rights would emerge.
2.

First Amendment Protections of Free Speech
and Expression

The First Amendment is the safeguard of freedom of speech
and expression in our society. 51 It provides that “Congress shall make
no law … abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.” 52 Two
widely accepted justifications for the First Amendment are: (1) The
fostering of a “free marketplace of ideas” essential to a democratic
society; and (2) “fulfilling the human need for self-expression.” 53
While many celebrities claim exclusive ownership under the right of
publicity for the use of their identities, 54 the defendants in these cases
argue that this power to exclude others from appropriating their
identities violates the free speech clause of the First Amendment
because it limits their means of expression. 55 To resolve this conflict,
courts have invoked a commercial speech doctrine. 56 Under this
doctrine, the First Amendment affords greater protection to
noncommercial speech because it serves as an essential service to the

49

White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993).
Id. (emphasizing that “creativity is impossible without a rich public domain” because
each creator builds on the works of those before him).
51 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
52 Id.
53 Roberta Rosenthall Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment: A Property
and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 66 (1994).
54 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 564 (1977) (arguing
that defendant appropriated his property right in his performance); White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1992) (alleging that Samsung used plaintiff’s
image in violation of plaintiff’s property right to her image).
55 See id. at 1397 (arguing that Samsung’s use of the robot was protected by the freedom of
expression); Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 396 (2001)
(arguing that plaintiff’s right of publicity claim violated defendant’s right to free speech and
expression that is protected under the First Amendment).
56 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 8:13.
50
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public. 57 Courts have relied on the line between commercial and
noncommercial speech in defining the common law right of publicity,
and have denied plaintiff’s right of publicity claims if the use is
noncommercial speech, 58 and granted protection when it has
constituted commercial speech. 59 The need for the balance of these
two important rights is clear; 60 however, courts are still struggling to
reach a consensus on the precise way to balance these interests fairly. 61
III.

BALANCING THE PROTECTIONS: THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
BALANCING TESTS
A.

The Rogers’ Test

The first test utilized to find a balance between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment is the Rogers’ test, which gained
its name from the case in which it originated, Rogers v. Grimaldi. 62 In
that case, the Second Circuit was faced with a challenge brought by
Ginger Rogers, an Academy Award winning actress, famous for her
appearance in a series of motion pictures with her co-star Fred

57 Noncommercial speech such as news is differentiated from commercial speech because
it provides valuable information to the public and contributes to the marketplace of ideas for
the public to enjoy. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 8:14-8:15.
58 G. D. v. Kenny, 15 A.2d 300, 321 (N.J. 2011) (holding that the use of a political aide’s
criminal history in a campaign flyer, created by public relations at the request of a political
opponent did not satisfy the commercial element of misappropriation).
59 White, 971 F.2d at 1398-99 (holding that because defendant’s misappropriation was used
in an advertisement, the use was implicating commercial interests and therefore constituted a
violation of the right of publicity); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d
831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that the use of Carson’s name in a commercial product
constituted infringement on his right of publicity by the defendant).
60 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977)
(emphasizing the importance of finding the balance between the two rights and reasoning that
Zacchini’s economic interest in his performance clearly outweighed the news station’s First
Amendment defense because it had taken the entire act to unjustly enrich the station); see
C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg. Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media L.P., 505 F.3d 818,
823 (8th Cir. 2007) (analyzing Zacchini as a direction by the Supreme Court that state law
rights of publicity must be balanced against first amendment considerations).
61 The Third and Ninth Circuits apply the transformative use test, while the Sixth Circuit
has applied the Rogers’ test and Missouri Courts have applied the predominant use test. See
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 166 (3d Cir. 2013); Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d
1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003); Doe v.
TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003).
62 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
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Astaire. 63 Rogers brought the action under the Lanham Act 64 against
the defendant company producers and directors of the movie entitled
“Ginger and Fred” for the use of her name claiming that it was false
endorsement. She also claimed the company producers and directors
violated her common law right of publicity and defamed her and
violated her common law right of privacy by depicting her in a false
light. 65 The film was about two fictional Italian cabaret performers
who became known as Ginger and Fred in Italy, but otherwise the
names had very little to do with either Ginger Rogers or Fred Astaire. 66
The defendants contended that the First Amendment right of free
expression protected the screenplay. 67
The Second Circuit first formulated a test for Lanham Act
liability claims, mandating that the Lanham Act should not be invoked
unless a title has no relevance to the underlying work, or if somewhat
relevant, is misleading. 68 The court reasoned that protecting a title that
lacks artistic bearing does not advance the interests of the First
Amendment free expression clause. 69 Additionally, it emphasized that
even if there is a slight relevance, if the work is considered seriously
misleading the Lanham Act should be invoked. 70 Therefore, under this
test, if a title is found to have at least some artistic relevance and is not
considered seriously misleading, it will not be a violation. 71

63 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996 (2d Cir. 1989). Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire
are a famous film duo known predominantly by their first names, Ginger and Fred. Id.
64 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (liability for “any person who shall affix, apply, annex, or use in
connection with any goods or services … a false designation of origin, or any false description
or representation … and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce”).
Congress created the Lanham Act in 1946 as a way to register and protect trademarks. In re
Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
65 Rogers, 875 F.2d, at 996-97. The false light defamation claim is not relevant for purposes
of this comment.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 997
68 Id. at 999 (when there are “misleading titles using a celebrity’s name, that balance will
normally not support application of the [Lanham] Act unless the title has no artistic relevance
to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title
explicitly misleads as to the source or content of the work.”). Id. This test has become known
as a “relevance test.” Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 788 (D.N.J. 2011).
69 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 1000.
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In addition to the Lanham Act test, 72 the court formulated a two
part right of publicity test in order to balance the plaintiff’s rights with
the defendant’s freedom of expression. 73 Under this test, the right of
publicity bars the use of a celebrity’s name in a title when: (1) the use
is “wholly unrelated” to the movie; or (2) the use is “simply a disguised
commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or services.” 74
The Second Circuit held that the film title “Ginger and Fred”
was clearly related to the film, since the main characters were named
Ginger and Fred. 75 Additionally, the court reasoned that the movie title
was not a disguised commercial advertisement employed to enhance
sales because it was actually a reflection on the film-maker’s artistic
expression. 76 Therefore, the court held that Rogers’ right of publicity
was not violated. 77 Thus, the first important test for balancing the right
of publicity protection with First Amendment freedoms was born.
There are two main flaws presented by the Rogers’ test. First,
the Rogers’ right of publicity test mirrors the Lanham Act test, which
is problematic because, unlike the Lanham Act, the right of publicity
does not require a showing that consumers are likely to be confused. 78
Thus, the scope of the right of publicity is more expansive than the
Lanham Act. 79 Second, the Rogers’ test has typically been applied in
cases involving the titles of work, 80 and potentially unfit for cases that
involve broader right of publicity claims. 81
72 The Lanham Act test, although not explicitly a right of publicity test, is important for
analysis in this comment because some courts have described the Lanham Act as the federal
equivalent of a state right of publicity. See Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th
47, 50 (2006).
73 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1002.
74 Id. at 1004.
75 Id. at 1001. The title refers directly to the film’s main characters who are known to the
audience by the names “Ginger and Fred.” Id.
76 Id. (referencing an affidavit from the filmmaker who explained he purposely used the
names as a way to satirize the banality of contemporary television).
77 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1005.
78 Id. at 1004; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (“any person who … uses in commerce any word, term,
name, symbol or device … which is likely to cause confusion … shall be liable for such act”).
See also Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 158 (3d Cir. 2013) (suggesting the weakness
of applying the Rogers’ trademark-based test to right of publicity actions without accounting
for the difference).
79 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004.
80 See, e.g., Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004 (applying the test to a movie title); Parks v. LaFace
Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying the test to a song title).
81 Hart, 717 F.3d at 157 (“We are concerned that this test is a blunt instrument, unfit for
widespread application in cases that require a carefully calibrated balancing of two
fundamental protections: the right of free expression and the right to control, manage, and
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The Transformative Use Test

The transformative use test is derived from the first factor of
the copyright fair use doctrine. 82 The California Supreme Court
adopted this test in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup,
Inc. 83 In that case, Comedy III was the owner of all rights to the former
comedy act known as The Three Stooges, and Saderup was an artist
recognized for his charcoal drawings of celebrities. 84 Saderup
converted charcoal drawings he had created of The Three Stooges to
lithographic prints, placed them on t-shirts, and sold the shirts for
profit. 85 Comedy III claimed that the use of the image of The Three
Stooges violated the Three Stooges’ right of publicity; however,
Saderup contended that his First Amendment rights of free speech and
expression would be violated if he were prohibited from creating and
selling the t-shirts. 86
The court applied the transformative use test, 87 and emphasized
that the main inquiry is “whether a product containing a celebrity
likeness is so transformed that it has become the defendant’s own
expression rather the celebrity’s likeness.” 88 Moreover, the court
recommended that in close cases, when determining whether a use is
sufficiently transformative, the court should look to the root of the

profit from one’s own identity.”); see also Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d
Cir. 2008) (recognizing that not many courts extended the Rogers’ test beyond a title of a
work); see also Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1281-82 (9th Cir. 2013)
(acknowledging that even the 6th Circuit, which originally adopted the Rogers’ test, later used
the transformative use test).
82 The court derived the test from the first factor for the copyright fair use doctrine
recognizing that the factor was “particularly pertinent to the task of reconciling the rights of
free expression and publicity.” Comedy III Prodc., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387,
404 (2001). In copyright, the transformative use test focuses on “whether the new work merely
supersedes the objects of the original creation, … or instead adds something new, with a
further purpose or character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
83 25 Cal. 4th 387 (2001).
84 Id. at 393.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 The transformative use test, similar to the transformative use test in copyright law,
focuses on whether and to what extent the new work has added something more to the work
or created a new purpose for the work. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
88 Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 406. The court also phrased the test as, “whether the celebrity
likeness is one of the raw materials from which an original work is synthesized, or whether
the depiction or imitation is the very sum and substance of the work in question.” Id.
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economic value of the work. 89 If the value of the work comes from a
source other than the depicted celebrity, such as the artistic ability of
the creator, then a right of publicity would generally not be
implicated. 90 Using this test, the court held that Saderup’s realistic
depictions of The Three Stooges were not transformative and therefore
not entitled to First Amendment protections. 91
The transformative use test has been subject to criticism since
it was adopted. 92 One leading commentator on the right of publicity
described the test as vague and unhelpful. 93 Additionally, as another
legal scholar emphasized, the test does not provide objective
guidelines, and as a result encourages judges to take the role of art
critics, which may cause a subjective determination based on the fame
of the artist. 94 Moreover, even the Comedy III court itself recognized
that the distinction between protected and unprotected expression,
under the transformative use test, is very “subtle.” 95 Thus, the
transformative use test puts substantial weight on the expressiveness
of the creation, and does not account for the potential commercial
exploitation of a celebrity in a work. 96 Although a creation may be
very expressive, the creator is still exploiting a celebrity’s identity in
his artwork without permission, which should also be considered when
balancing the right of publicity with the freedom of expression.
C.

Predominant Use Test

The third test is the predominant use test. The Missouri
Supreme Court rejected both the Rogers’ test and the transformative
89

Id. at 407.
Id. (reasoning that when the value of the work comes from a source other than the fame
of the celebrity, the work is presumed to have sufficient transformative elements to warrant a
First Amendment defense).
91 Id. at 409 (holding that the literal depictions of The Three Stooges substantially exploited
their fame, and that the economic value of his work derived from the fame of the celebrities).
92 Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of PublicityFree Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 493 (2003) (noting that the
transformative use test can be problematic).
93 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 8:71-§ 8:72 (emphasizing that “difficulty of application
and incertitude of result are the hallmarks of the court’s transformative test.”).
94 David Tan, Political Recording of the Contemporary Celebrity and the First Amendment,
2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 25-26 (2011).
95 Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 811.
96 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003). Under the transformative use
test, a work that is created for the sole purpose of commercially exploiting a celebrity’s identity
is not actionable if it is found sufficiently transformed in expression. Id.
90
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use test, and adopted a “more balanced predominant use test.” 97 In
Doe. TCI Cablevision, Anthony “Tony” Twist, a former National
Hockey League player, sued the defendants for alleged use of his
identity in a comic book series. 98 The series contained a villain named
“Tony Twist Twistelli,” who was characterized as a tough guy, similar
to the plaintiff. 99
In its holding, the court adopted the predominant use test,
which stated that if a product being sold “predominantly exploits the
commercial value of an individual’s identity, that product should be
held to violate the right of publicity.” 100 Conversely, if the purpose of
the product is predominantly to make an expressive comment or
statement, it should be allotted greater protection. 101 In applying this
test, the court found that the use of the plaintiff’s identity was
predominantly to boost product sales, 102 and not to create an artistic
expression, and therefore “free speech must give way to the right of
publicity.” 103
The problem with the predominant use test is that, while trying
to include actions that would otherwise be dismissed under the Rogers’
or transformative use tests, 104 it does not provide guidance for uses that
are simultaneously commercial and expressive. 105 This is problematic
because although speech that is deemed to be fully expressional speech
is granted greater protection under the First Amendment freedom of
97

Id.
Id. at 365.
99 Id. at 366 (recognizing that the fictional and real Tony are only similar in nickname and
characteristic, and did not have physical resemblance).
100 Doe, 110 S.W.3d.at 374 (emphasizing that even if the product contains some expressive
content, and might otherwise qualify as speech, it should not be protected by the First
Amendment when the predominant purpose is to exploit the commercial value of the
celebrity).
101 Id. This differs from the transformative use test which focuses on the expressive nature
of the work itself; however, the predominant use test determines the prevailing purpose
intended with the exploitation of the celebrity’s identity, not the extent it has been transformed.
102 Id. (stating that “the metaphorical reference to Twist, though a literary device, has very
little value compared to its commercial value.”).
103 Id.
104 Id. (cautioning that the tests preclude actions whenever a use is expressive, regardless of
the commercial exploitation).
105 The first step in the predominant use test is to determine if the predominant purpose of
the work is to exploit commercial value of the celebrity. If the court finds that this is in fact
the predominant purpose of the work, according to Doe, 110 S.W.3d at 374, it should not be
afforded protection under the First Amendment. Pursuant to this analysis, the court will never
even consider the expressive nature of the work.
98
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expression, not all speech is purely expressional. 106 Many times a
work or expression will fall somewhere between the spectrum of
commercial and expressive and therefore the use must be balanced
properly with competing rights. 107 Additionally the predominant use
test is vulnerable to the subjectivity of the judges. 108 It requires judges
to act as art critics and determine the level of the expressiveness that a
particular work has. 109 It is not proper for courts to discern the artistic
elements of a work. 110
The transformative use test is currently the test used in a
majority of circuits. 111 Thus, this test has been deemed to be the least
problematic of the three, even in light of the aforementioned
problems. 112
IV.

COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
A.

Copyright Law

The United States Constitution grants Congress the power to
enact the copyright law for the purpose of promoting science and
fostering the creation of ideas. 113 Congress, pursuant to this power,
enacted the Copyright Act of 1976, and granted exclusive rights to
original works of authorship. 114 The purpose of the Copyright Act is

106 Michael Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc. & Super Valu, Inc., WL 12-1992, 3 (2014).
(Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern
Division) (recognizing that expressional speech grants more protection than commercial
speech, but there can be speech which is a mix of both).
107 Id.
108 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that “the predominant
use test is subjective at best, arbitrary at worst”).
109 Id. (cautioning that a judge cannot act as both an impartial jurist and a discerning art
critic).
110 Id. (recognizing that it is improper for “courts to analyze select elements of a work to
determine how much they contribute to the entire work’s expressiveness.”).
111 The Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits use the transformative use test. See Hart, 717 F.3d
at 163; ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Company, 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003); Keller v. Elec.
Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013).
112 See supra notes 92-96.
113 U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 8 (“to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts”).
114 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016) (“Copyright protection … subsists in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression); id. at § 106 (“The owner of a
copyright under this title has exclusive rights.”). The exclusive rights enable a copyright
holder to have the ability to reproduce and distribute copies of their works, prepare derivatives
based on the original, and to perform or display or transmit the work publicly. Id.
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to promote creation and distribute the creative works to the public.115
The exclusive rights enhance the goal of the Copyright Act by
providing authors with protection for their creativity and investment,
and with an incentive to create more works by guaranteeing
availability to the public. 116 However, these exclusive rights can also
hinder the goals of the Copyright Act by creating a monopoly over the
creations, thus preventing access to preexisting works. 117 Authors and
creators depend on the works of others in order to create their own
individualized works. 118 Thus, there is a strong desire to balance the
tension between protecting exclusive rights and the public’s need to
access preexisting works. 119 The framers of the Constitution
recognized that while providing authors with control of their creations
provided incentive to continue creating, they also needed to ensure that
society could benefit from the availability of these creations, and
therefore they mandated that the copyright protection be “for limited
times.” 120 Accordingly, acting on this constitutional command,
Congress placed limitations on the exclusive rights, including a fair
use limitation.121

115

Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (stating that the goal of the Copyright Act
is to disseminate creative works to the public).
116 Tina Ham, The Right of Publicity: Finding a Balance in the Fair Use Doctrine –
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 543, 561 (2003) referencing
CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 13, 333 (5th ed. 2001) (“As reward for [author’s]
contribution to the storehouse of human knowledge, she receives ownership of a copyright in
the work.”).
117 Randall T.E. Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair Use Defense in Right of Publicity Cases,
29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 813 (1988).
118 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (“in truth, in
literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which, in an abstract
sense, are strictly new and original throughout.)”. For example, 2 Live Crew, a rap group,
used a preexisting country song to create a parodied rap song. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
119 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2015) (emphasizing that
the overall objectives of copyright law are to “expand public knowledge and understanding”
by providing an “incentive to create informative, intellectually enriching works for public
consumption.”).
120 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
121 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. 2001) (“Limitation on exclusive rights: … the fair use of a
copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section, for purposes of criticism, comment, news, reporting,
teaching, scholarship, or research is not an infringement of copyright.”). Fair Use Doctrine is
also accepted in common law precedents. See generally Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569; Stewart
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Comparison of Copyright Law and The Right of
Publicity

Copyright law and the right of publicity share some similar
purposes. 122 While copyright law grants exclusive rights to authors of
original creations, the right of publicity grants a celebrity the exclusive
right to his identity. 123 Both copyright law and the right of publicity
provide incentives for creativity while benefitting public welfare. 124
Additionally, both copyright law and the right of publicity ensure that
the “creators” will be able to reap the rewards from their endeavors. 125
While copyright law and the right of publicity naturally have
undeniable similarities, 126 their differences cannot be ignored when
altering the fair use doctrine of copyright protection to fit the right of
v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539 (1985).
122 See infra notes 123-25.
123 17 U.S.C. § 106 (granting copyright owners the exclusive rights to reproduce, prepare
derivatives, distribute copies, and to perform, display, or transmit publicly). Restatement
(Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995) (granting an exclusive right to celebrities of their
identities by prohibiting the appropriation of the commercial value of a person’s identity). See
also Coyne, supra note 117, at 814 (“If copyright grants exclusive rights in creative works, the
right of publicity grants exclusive rights in personal attributes.”).
124 Stewart, 495 U.S. at 228 (stating that the goal of the Copyright Act is to disseminate
creative works to the public); Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n,
805 F.2d 663, 678 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The reason that state law protects individual pecuniary
interests is to provide an incentive to performers to invest the time and resources required to
develop such performances.”); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562,
576 (1977) (“Ohio’s decision to protect petitioner’s right of publicity here rests on more than
a desire to compensate the performer for the time and effort invested in his act; the protection
provides an economic incentive for him to make an investment required to produce a
performance of interest to the public. This same consideration underlies the patent and
copyrights laws long enforced by this court.”).
125 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576. The Court in Zacchini recognized the importance of the
ability of a performer to capitalize from the very activity that made him famous in the first
place, and emphasized that this was the very essence of the right of publicity protection. Id.
See also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (Alcaron,
J., dissenting) (emphasizing the need to protect and reward the work and investment of those
who create intellectual property).
126 See supra notes 123-25.
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publicity policies. The most obvious is that right of publicity protects
the identity of a person, while copyright protects works that have been
fixed in tangible form. While the right of publicity can protect a sound,
such as a celebrity voice 127 or a nickname, 128 copyright protection is
only afforded to an original expression of an idea in tangible form, but
not to the idea itself. 129 Courts have expressed wariness in applying a
wholesale incorporation of the copyright fair use doctrine to right of
publicity law without compensating for the differences. 130
C.

Copyright Fair Use Doctrine

The Fair Use Doctrine acts as a balance between the interests
of individual authors and the interests of the public by limiting the
potential of copyright monopolies. 131 The doctrine allows for the fair
use of copyrighted works “to fulfill copyright’s purpose To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” 132 and, to advance
copyright’s goal to provide protection to authors and inventors and
simultaneously permit others to use protected works to advance the
progress of arts and sciences. 133 As noted by Justice Story, “every
book in literature, science, and art, borrows, and must borrow, and use
much which was well known and used before.” 134 The Fair Use
Doctrine allows for this evolution of creation in literature, science, and
art in a way that still provides protection to original creators.

127

Kirby, infra notes 221-23.
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983)
(granting relief to Carson for the unauthorized use of the phrase “Here’s Johnny”).
129 17 U.S.C. § 102 (“Copyright protection subsists … in original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression ….”).
130 Comedy III Prodc., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 404 (Cal. 2001)
(expressing the belief that some copyright fair use factors are designed to apply to the partial
copying of works and will not be helpful in “determining whether the depiction of a celebrity
is protected by the First Amendment.”).
131 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (“The Copyright Act … creates a balance
between the artist’s right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and
the public’s need for access to creative works.”).
132 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985); see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8,
cl. 8.
133 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing that
while authors are important intended beneficiaries of copyright, the public is also an important
beneficiary).
134 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845)).
128
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The Fair Use Doctrine is an affirmative defense to copyright
infringement actions. 135 It “provides [and requires] courts to avoid
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would
stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.” 136 The
doctrine requires a case-by-case analysis, 137 and calls for all four
factors of the doctrine to be explored and weighed together in light of
the purposes of copyright. 138
The first factor in the fair use analysis is “the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.” 139 The statute
provides examples that guide the court in making a determination
under this factor. 140 Courts look to see whether the work merely
“supersedes” or “supplants” the original creation, 141 or if the work is
“transformative.” 142 If a court finds that the use is transformative, then
this factor will weigh in favor of the defense. 143
The transformative use determination is the most important
part of the court’s analysis of the first factor; 144 however, finding
transformative use is not absolutely necessary. 145 Courts also consider
the commerciality of the work, deciding whether it serves a
commercial use, or some other purpose. 146 In general, a work that is
135

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
Id. at 577, quoting Stewart, 495 U.S. at 236.
137 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560;
138 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78 (stating that the four factors enumerated in the statute are
non-exclusive and provide only “general guidance;” they are “to be explored and weighed
together in light of the purposes of copyright.”).
139 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (Supp. 2001).
140 17 U.S.C. § 107 (Supp. 2001) (“the fair use of a copyrighted work … for purposes such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright”).
141 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; accord Harper & Row, 471 U.S at 562.
142 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. A work is transformative if it adds something new, with a
further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or
message. Id.
143 See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 217 (2d Cir. 2015). The court
held that Google’s use of copyrighted books was highly transformative because it changed the
copyrighted books into comprehensive word indexes, providing scholars with a helpful way
to identify books, and adding value to the basic transformative search function. Id.
144 Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that
“the concept of ‘transformative use’ is central to a proper analysis under the first factor”). See
also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (stating that the more transformative the new work is the less
significant the other factors will be).
145 Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 (1984).
146 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (Supp. 2015).
136
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commercial tends to weigh against a fair use finding; 147 however, a
commercial element in the use alone does not conclusively bar fair
use. 148
The second factor in the fair use determination is the nature of
the copyrighted work. 149 The primary considerations here are whether
the work is fiction or non-fiction, or published or non-published. 150
Additionally, this factor recognizes that some works are closer to the
intention of copyright protection than others, and tries to ensure that
those works will be protected. 151 A work that is creative in nature
weighs against fair use, while factual works receive less protection. 152
The third factor in the fair use analysis is the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole. 153 The primary inquiry here is whether the quality and the
quantity of the copied material are reasonable in relation to the purpose
of the copied use. 154 The court considers “the degree to which the work
147 In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court emphasized that
“every commercial use is presumptively … unfair ….” 464 U.S. at 451. Courts later clarified
that the mere commercial character of a use does not bar a finding of fairness. Campbell, 510
U.S. at 584; Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
148 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (emphasizing that commercial nature is but one of four
important factors in determining fair use); see also Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 219
(recognizing that Google undoubtedly had a profit motivation, but this motivation did not deny
a fair use defense).
149 17 U.S.C. § 107(2). The second factor is the least helpful factor in determining fair use
and is rarely found to be determinative. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586 (stating that the factor is
not likely much help in any case when separating the “fair use sheep from the infringing
goats”); Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 220 (noting that the second factor rarely plays a significant
role in fair use determination); Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 709 (2d Cir. 2013) (making the
distinction that the factor is particularly useless in actions where the work of art is being used
for a transformative purpose).
150 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (recognizing that whether a work is
published is critical to its nature under factor two because the scope of fair use is narrower
with respect to unpublished works).
151 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. See, e.g., Stewart, 495 U.S. at 237-38 (contrasting fictional
short stories with factual works); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563-64 (contrasting soon-to-bepublished memoir with published speech); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) (contrasting motion pictures with news broadcasts); Feist
Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348-51 (1985) (contrasting
creative works with bare factual compilations).
152 There is a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy, and
these factual works are more susceptible to a finding of fair use. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586;
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563-64; Stewart, 495 U.S. at 237-38.
153 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).
154 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-87 (suggesting that no more than what is necessary should
be taken).
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may serve as a market substitute for the original.” 155 Moreover, a
majority of courts have held that even when a work has been copied in
its entirety, it may still be fair use. 156 For example, a complete copying
of a work can be appropriate in instances where there is a
transformative purpose. 157 Additionally, when determining whether
the copying was qualitatively substantial, the court looks to see
whether the heart of the original was used and made into the heart of
the new work. 158
The fourth factor is the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work. 159 The purpose of this
factor is to protect copyright owners against uses that would cause
economic harm. 160 Courts look not only at the extent of the market
harm to the original, but also to potential derivative works, 161 because
the licensing of derivatives is an important economic incentive to
creation. 162 However, courts must be sure to consider only those
derivative markets that the creators would in general develop. 163 When
a work is not transformative and is merely a duplicate of the original,
substantial market harm can occur because the work may act as a

155

Id. at 587-88.
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984).
157 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 221 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing that
“complete unchanged copying has repeatedly been found justified as fair use when the copying
was reasonably appropriate to the copier’s transformative purpose”); see also Campbell, 510
U.S. 569 at 587 (holding that a parody’s humor comes from the ability to recognize the original
through the imitation, and thus even though the parody is exact copying, it is reasonable to the
extent that it was meant to parody the original).
158 Id. (reasoning that “a work composed primarily of an original, particularly its heart, with
little added or changed, is more likely to be a merely superseding use” and favors protection
for the original); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564-68
(1985) (emphasizing that even though the Nation had only taken 300 words from President
Ford’s memoirs, the significance of the quotations amounted to the heart of the book, the part
that was likely to be newsworthy and important in licensing).
159 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
160 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590.
161 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (“the inquiry must take account not only of harm to the
original but also of harm to the market for derivative works.”).
162 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592; see 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (copyright owners have exclusive
rights “to prepare derivative works”).
163 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (recognizing that there is no protectable derivative market for
criticism because it is unlikely that the creator of a work would license critical reviews of his
own product).
156
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market replacement. 164 However, a transformative use that provides a
different function from the original favors a finding of fair use. 165
As previously mentioned, copyright law and the right of
publicity share similar purposes. 166 Both grant the creators exclusive
rights and provide incentives for creativity. 167 Additionally, both areas
of law have experienced conflicts with the competing First
Amendment freedom of expression interests. 168 Thus, while some
courts have expressed wariness of a wholesale adoption of the
copyright fair use factors, 169 these above factors, when altered to
accommodate right of publicity law, would be critical in balancing the
First Amendment with the right of publicity.
V.

FACTORS FOR THE PROPOSED FAIR USE – RIGHT OF

164 Id. at 591 (reasoning that a transformative use is less likely to serve as a market
substitution).
165 Id. Accordingly, in Authors Guild, the court found that Google Books was not likely to
harm the market for books because it does not replace the books, it merely scans them. The
scan does not replace the physical book, but rather utilizes it and creates an additional
beneficial use of the physical book. Additionally, it found that Google Books actually
enhances the sale of books because it acts similarly to an in-store book display and provides
researchers with a way to identify books for purchase. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804
F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2015).
166 See supra notes 123-25.
167 17 U.S.C. § 106 (this section grants copyright owners the exclusive rights to reproduce,
prepare derivatives, distribute copies, and to perform, display, or transmit publicly).
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 46 (1995) (grants exclusive right to celebrities
of their identities by prohibiting the appropriation of the commercial value of a person’s
identity). See also Coyne, supra note 117, at 814 (“If copyright grants exclusive rights in
creative works, the right of publicity grants exclusive rights in personal attributes.”).
168 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985)
(recognizing that the Copyright Act must be balanced with the First Amendment); Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 574-75 (1977) (emphasizing the importance
of balancing the right of publicity and the First Amendment).
169 Comedy III Prodc., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 404 (2001) (expressing
the belief that some copyright fair use factors are designed to apply to the partial copying of
works and will not be helpful in “determining whether the depiction of a celebrity is protected
by the First Amendment.”).
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PUBLICITY DOCTRINE
A.

Adjusting the Factors

The incorporation of copyright fair use factors to right of
publicity law has been suggested by scholars in the past. 170 While
some believe that this would be beneficial, others do not think that it
would provide the best solution to balancing the competing First
Amendment and right of publicity rights. 171 This comment, however,
offers a new solution, and in addition to adjusted fair use factors,
proposes a fifth factor, which utilizes the likelihood of confusion test
for right of publicity actions coined by the Second Circuit in the
Rogers’ case. 172 This helps to bridge the gap between the expansive
right of publicity protection and the more confined Lanham Act
protection, 173 and incorporates the important considerations of the
Lanham Act, which is also frequently asserted in right of publicity
actions. 174
1.

The Nature of the Use

The prima facie case for a violation of the right of publicity
requires a showing of commerciality, 175 and therefore, this factor will
not focus on whether the use is of commercial nature, as in the first
170

See generally Tina Ham, The Right of Publicity: Finding a Balance in the Fair Use
Doctrine – Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 543, 561 (2003);
Randall T.E. Coyne, Toward a Modified Fair Use Defense in Right of Publicity Cases, 29 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 781, 813 (1988); Michael Schoenberger, Unnecessary Roughness:
Reconciling Hart and Keller with a Fair Use Standard Benefitting the Right of Publicity, 45
CONN. L. REV. 1875, 1879 (2013).
171 MCCARTHY, supra note 262, at § 8:38.
172 See supra notes 68-71.
173 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 158 (3d Cir. 2013) (suggesting the weakness of
applying the Rogers’ trademark-based test to right of publicity actions without accounting for
the differences between the two actions).
174 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992)
(plaintiff brought an action for a violation of her right of publicity and a violation under the
Lanham Act); Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir.
1983) (plaintiff brought the action alleging violation of his right of publicity and the Lanham
Act).
175 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 3:2 (stating that the prima facie case for a right of
publicity is: 1- the plaintiff “owns an enforceable right in the identity or persona”; 2 –
“defendant, without permission, used some aspect of the identity in such a way that plaintiff
is identifiable from defendant’s use;” and the use is “likely to cause damage to the commercial
value of that persona.”).
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factor of the copyright fair use doctrine, and will instead focus heavily
on whether the use is transformative. 176 However, similar to the first
factor of the copyright fair use doctrine, creations that are for criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research, generally
will not constitute misappropriation. 177
Since most misappropriations in the right of publicity area do
not fall cleanly into one of those categories, courts must determine the
expressiveness of the misappropriations, and determine whether the
use was transformative enough to not violate a celebrity’s right of
publicity. 178 Thus, this factor embraces the transformative use test
derived from Comedy III and adopted by the Third and Ninth Circuits
for state law right of publicity claims. 179 However, because the test is
now a factor in an affirmative defense, it will no longer be dispositive
as it was in the Third and Ninth Circuit cases. 180 Instead, similar to the
first factor of the copyright fair use doctrine, 181 there is an emphasis on
the degree to which the new expression is transformative. 182 If the use

176 The first factor in copyright fair use doctrine specifies a determination of whether the
use was commercial. 17 U.S.C. 107(1) (“including whether such use is of a commercial nature
or is for nonprofit educational purposes”). This factor for the right of publicity fair use
doctrine will instead focus on the most important determination under the first factor, which
is whether the use was transformative. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d
913, 923 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing that “the concept of ‘transformative use’ is central to a
proper analysis under the first factor”); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
579 (1994) (stating that the more transformative the new work is the less significant the other
factors will be).
177 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“The fair use of a copyrighted work … for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright”). In Campbell, the Court emphasized that the
examples are “illustrative and not limitative” and “provide only a general guidance about the
sorts of copying that courts and Congress most commonly have found to be fair uses.”
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. The same emphasis should be applied in the Right of Publicity
Defense; the categories provide only general guidance.
178 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (recognizing the need for a case-by-case analysis and not
a bright-line rule).
179 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153 (3d Cir. 2013) (adopting the transformative
use test because it was “flexible – yet uniformly applicable”); Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724
F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming the decision of the district court which utilized the
transformative use test).
180 Hart, 717 F.3d at 163; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276.
181 See supra note 144.
182 This is similar to the transformative use concept in the copyright fair use doctrine. Just
as in copyright, this test focuses on the degree to which a work is transformative, and finds
that “the more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors.”
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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is highly transformative, 183 then the factor will weigh towards fair
use. 184
Notably, the Seventh Circuit has questioned the importance of
the transformative use test under the first factor of a copyright fair use
determination. 185 The Seventh Circuit fears that such a strong
emphasis on whether a use is transformative might diminish the
importance of the statutory factors. 186 Instead, in its copyright fair use
analysis the court determines whether a use is complementary to the
protected work, which is allowed, or a substitute, which is not
permitted. 187 However, the Second Circuit has subsequently criticized
the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning, 188 and reiterated the importance of the
transformative use test in all copyright fair use determinations.189
Thus, this first factor, despite the criticism of the Seventh Circuit in
copyright law, 190 includes an emphasis on the degree to which the new
expression is transformative. 191
Moreover, this factor incorporates the predominant use test,
using the same concept of deterring the commercial exploitation of a
celebrity’s identity, 192 but making it less harsh for those creators who
did not intend to capitalize from the use. Thus, this factor also
acknowledges that although an identity may have been utilized in a
creation, the creator in this instance is no longer receiving a
commercial benefit from the celebrity’s identity, which presumably is
part of this new work, but is instead profiting from the new creation
itself.

183

A work is transformative if it adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with a new meaning. Id.
184 Id.
185 Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 216, n.18 (2d Cir. 2015).
189 Id.
190 Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758.
191 The transformative use test has been recognized as an important test in right of publicity
law since its creation in Comedy III, and has since been adopted as the dispositive test in the
Third and Ninth Circuits. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 153 (3d Cir. 2013) (adopting
the transformative use test because it was “flexible – yet uniformly applicable”); Keller v.
Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013) (affirming the decision of the district court
which utilized the transformative use test).
192 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003), supra notes 101-03.
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Nature of the Publicity Right

This factor is notably different from the factor in the copyright
fair use doctrine. In copyright, the factor focuses on whether the work
is published/non-published, or fiction/non-fiction. 193 However, in the
right of publicity, this factor focuses on the amount of work a celebrity
dedicated to establishing his famed identity. The factor builds on the
reasoning in Zacchini, in which the Supreme Court recognized that a
celebrity should be able to reap the benefits of his own labor. 194 This
factor can be considered to mirror the “sweat of the brow” theory, 195
emphasizing that an individual should be able to benefit from the
efforts he exercised to establish a famous identity. 196 Accordingly, as
one legal scholar noted, “while one person may build a home, and
another knit a sweater so also may a third create a valuable
personality.” 197 An individual, under this factor, is incentivized to
create a celebrity identity through his own efforts, instead of having
one thrust upon him. The more effort a celebrity has put into achieving
the status of fame, the less this factor will lean towards fair use. 198
Thus, this factor is measured by determining whether the
publicity was earned, which encompasses those celebrities who
dedicate their time and effort to establish their fame, or whether the
publicity was incidental, which includes those whose fame is thrust

193

Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990).
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (reasoning that
because the press broadcasted Zacchini’s entire performance, it hindered his ability to earn a
living as a performer). The very essence of right of publicity protection is that a performer be
able to capitalize from the very activity that made him famous in the first place. Id.
195 Sweat of the brow is the underlying policy of the unjust enrichment justification. It
emphasizes that an individual is entitled to the ownership of his own creation. MCCARTHY,
supra note 12, at § 2:5. The “sweat of the brow” theory has been discredited for copyright
protection because it distinctly goes against a “fundamental axiom of copyright law – that no
one may copyright facts or ideas.” Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499
U.S. 340, 352-56 (1985).
196 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574 (holding that there is no social purpose served by allowing an
individual to get free some aspect of another that would otherwise have market value and
would normally induce a profit). See also Nimmer, supra note 17, at 216 (emphasizing that
an individual is “entitled to the fruits of his own labors”).
197 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at §§ 2.1; 2.6.
198 Coyne, supra note 117 (when a celebrity “persona is entirely of his own creation, his
publicity rights deserve more protection”).
194
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upon them by the public and media. 199 As one legal scholar noted, an
individual who attains fame “through sheer luck … public scandal, or
… grossly immoral conduct” should not receive the same publicity
protection as those who have earned their fame. 200 A celebrity who
has earned his fame, in the eyes of the public, has attained a higher
quality of fame as opposed to one who has had fame thrust upon them,
and thus the quality of the earned celebrity’s identity is greater and
should be adequately protected. 201 Accordingly, the earned/incidental
publicity determination accounts for the fact that not all celebrities
achieve fame through their own efforts. 202
For example, under this second factor, a celebrity such as
Michael Phelps, 203 who has gone through extensive training and hard
work to get to where he is today, 204 represents a celebrity with earned
publicity. In the public eye, Michael Phelps has achieved a highquality identity as a result of his Olympic achievements. 205 On the
other hand, Kylie Jenner, who has become famous from her role on the
reality TV show that films her family, 206 embodies a celebrity falling
in the incidental publicity category. While many people recognize
Kylie Jenner as a celebrity, and even buy her makeup products within
minutes of their release, 207 the quality of her identity is less than
Michael Phelps’ because of the way it was achieved.

199 See Schoenberg, supra note 19, at 1912 (suggesting that the best way to differentiate
between the two publicity rights is to classify them as either active or passive and weigh the
factor accordingly).
200 Michael Madow, Private Ownership of a Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 179 (1993).
201 Id.
202 Id. at 184 (arguing that to believe that a celebrity’s fame is entirely the result of his own
labors is the “folklore of celebrity;” when in reality, celebrities owe much of their fame to
social factors and other individuals who contributed to creating the value of their identities).
203 Michael Phelps is an Olympic Swimmer who has won 18 gold medals. Michael Phelps,
SWIMSWAM, https://swimswam.com/bio/michael-phelps/#medals (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
204 Michael Phelps, SWIMSWAM, https://swimswam.com/bio/michael-phelps/ (last visited
Mar. 7, 2017).
205 Id.
206 Kylie Jenner Fires Back at Critics Says She Deserves to Be on List of Influential Teens,
ABC NEWS (Oct. 30, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/kylie-jenner-fires-backcritics-deserves-list-influential/story?id=34856680.
207 Kylie Jenner’s New Lip Kits Sold Out in Less Than 10 Minutes, ELLE (Feb. 15, 2016),
http://www.elle.com/beauty/makeup-skin-care/news/a33867/kylie-jenner-new-lip-kits-sellout-in-10-minutes/
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Notably, Michael Phelps has had his own episodes of public
scandal. 208 In 2014, Phelps was even suspended from his Olympic
training by the USA Swimming team for six months because of his
public scandal. 209 However, for the purposes of this factor, this public
scandal would not reduce the high-quality level of publicity that Phelps
has achieved. Phelps’s publicity originated from his Olympic
achievements, 210 which as noted above, fall within the earned publicity
category. 211 Although a celebrity may encounter some negative
publicity throughout his or her career, this factor focuses on the origin
of the publicity, and thus, any publicity, be it positive or negative after
the celebrity has become famous in the eyes of the public, does not
affect this factor.
Both Michael Phelps and Kylie Jenner are celebrities with
known identities that would generate commercial value when
misappropriated. 212 However, under this factor, the level of publicity
protection is greater when a celebrity dedicates his life to achieve such
fame and creates high quality fame. 213 In contrast, when the celebrity
did not invest as much into achieving fame, the identity represents a
lesser quality and the factor will lean more towards fair use.
3.

Substantiality of the Misappropriation

For this factor, the court evaluates the extent of the
misappropriation. 214 Unlike copyright, the application of this factor

208 In 2014 Michael Phelps was charged with his second Driving Under the Influence
offense. After this, he entered a six-week in-patient rehabilitation program. Michael Phelps
suspended by USA Swimming for six months, CNN (Oct. 7, 2014),
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/10/06/sport/michael-phelps-suspended/.
209 Id.
210 Michael Phelps, SWIMSWAM, https://swimswam.com/bio/michael-phelps/ (last visited
Mar. 7, 2017).
211 See supra notes 204-05.
212 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing
that the more popular a celebrity becomes, the easier it is to evoke her identity, and the more
attractive the celebrity is to advertisers, and as a result the identities of the most popular
celebrities should be afforded ample protection from advertisers).
213 See supra note 198; see also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic
Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 540–541 (concluding that a “defendant’s expressive use … cannot
be divorced from the value the plaintiff’s efforts have given to it”).
214 Schoenberger, supra note 19, at 1913.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/14

28

DiGregorio: The Right of Publicity

2017

THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY

1023

emphasizes the quantity of the expression rather than the quality. 215
The court in Comedy III emphasized that courts should not be
concerned with the quality of the artistic work at issue, 216 but instead
the question should be “whether the literal and imitative or the
expressive elements predominate a work.” 217 This reasoning has been
reiterated by subsequent court decisions, recognizing that judges
should not act as art critics. 218
Moreover, similar to the reasoning of Comedy III, that the
determination should be whether the product using a celebrity’s
identity has been transformed in a way that causes it to be primarily
the creator’s own expression, 219 this factor considers the work in
question as a whole when defining the extent of the misappropriation.
The California Appellate Court is at the forefront of this
reasoning. Two influential cases regarding right of publicity
protection in video games applied this reasoning using the
transformative use test, and considered aspects of the games that were
not part of the celebrity’s physical identity in their determinations.220
In both cases, a celebrity’s identity was fashioned into a video game
character without their permission. 221 To determine if these games
should be afforded First Amendment protection, both courts
considered the extent of this misappropriation when viewed as a whole
in the video games. 222 Neither court focused on the artistic nature or
the quality of the character of the video game, but rather they
215 See supra note 158 (stressing that in the qualitative determination, courts look to see if
the “heart of the work” was taken). In the copyright fair use determination, even if a work is
copied in its entirety, it may still be afforded fair use protection. Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984).
216 Comedy III Prodc., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 407 (2001) (noting that
even vulgar expressions qualify for First Amendment protection).
217 Id.
218 See supra note 94; see also supra note 109.
219 Comedy III, 25 Cal. 4th at 406.
220 Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (2006); No Doubt v. Activision,
Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018 (2011).
221 Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 51 (explaining that the plaintiff was a famous singer who
alleged the defendant video game producer based a character in the game on her identity); No
Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1024 (stating that the plaintiffs were famous musicians alleging
the defendant used their identities in the video game, Band Hero).
222 Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 59 (emphasizing that the fictional space setting and role of
the character in the game as a space-age reporter in the 21st century was not a misappropriation
of the celebrity who was actually a famous singer); No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1033
(finding that the video game characters who were portrayed as musicians were exact replicas
of the celebrities themselves and therefore was an extensive misappropriation by the
defendant).
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considered what quantity of each celebrity’s identity was
misappropriated. 223
In Kirby v. Sega of America Inc., 224 the court found that the
First Amendment protected the video game’s use of the celebrity’s
identity, 225 and that although the video game character was undeniably
a spin-off of the famous celebrity singer, 226 the quantity of these
similarities was outweighed by the dissimilar attributes. 227 However,
in No Doubt v. Activision Inc., 228 the court found that the First
Amendment did not protect a video game’s use of the celebrities’
identities because the characters and the setting in which they were
used were all exact replicas of the celebrities. 229 Thus, the extent of
the misappropriation was very great. 230
Kirby and No Doubt were correct in their reasoning and
together provide a basis for the application of this factor. Therefore,
under this factor, if the expressive elements of a work overpower the
literal or imitative aspects, thereby limiting the extent of the
misappropriation, the factor will favor fair use. 231 However, if the
quantity of the copying of a celebrity’s identity outweighs the
expressive elements, the factor will weigh against fair use.
4.

The Effect of the Use on the Potential Market

The fourth factor in this affirmative defense asks whether the
misappropriation affects the celebrity’s use of her own identity on the
potential market or licensing market. This is similar to the fourth factor
in the copyright fair use doctrine, 232 which the Supreme Court
223

See supra note 222.
144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (2006).
225 Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 59.
226 Id. at 55-56. (listing the similarities of Kirby and Ulala, including body and eye shape,
lip and hair color, clothing, and even catch phrases).
227 Id. at 59.
228 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018 (2011).
229 No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1033.
230 Id.
231 This factor utilizes the reasoning of the courts in both Kirby and No Doubt, which both
weigh the extent of the celebrities’ identity, including the settings in which a celebrity was
found, in their reasoning. See also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399
(9th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing that while the robot with blonde hair and white dress alone may
not be extensive misappropriation, when coupled with the setting of the Wheel of Fortune
game show, it was an obvious and all-embracing misappropriation of the celebrity identity).
232 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
224
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described stating, “a use that has no demonstrable effect upon the
publicity market for, or the value of, the copyrighted work need not be
prohibited in order to protect the author’s incentive to create.” 233
The scope for which a celebrity can suffer a commercial injury
expands from a simple misappropriation of a celebrity’s reputation, 234
and extends to the appropriation of an entire work that correlates with
a celebrity’s identity. 235 According to the Restatement, courts should
analyze the market effect “in light of the informational or creative
comment of the defendant’s use.” 236 For example, in Zacchini, where
the defendant news company misappropriated Zacchini’s entire human
cannonball performance, the commercial use lacked any creative
comment, and the commercial harm therefore was extensive. 237
Additionally, just as a court under the fourth factor in the
copyright fair use doctrine looks to derivative markets, 238 under this
factor, the court will consider the effect the misappropriation has on
licensing markets. An example is when a celebrity’s misappropriated
identity is a performance. 239 Pursuant to the example from Zacchini,240
not only did the defendant news company infringe on Zacchini’s
ability to capitalize on his live performance, 241 it also caused
commercial injury in a licensing market. 242 The defendant news
company infringed Zacchini’s right to license his performance to other
news companies that may have been willing to pay to broadcast his
performance at a later date. 243 Instead, these companies could use the
233

Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 (1984).
For example, in Carson, the court held that the defendant’s use of the phrase “Here’s
Johnny” for his business capitalized on the reputation of Johnny Carson and therefore
amounted to an appropriation of his identity. Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,
698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983).
235 In Zacchini, the Court found that the news program’s airing of the plaintiff’s entire act
hindered the plaintiff’s ability to reap the benefits of his endeavors, and thus was an intrusion
on his right of publicity. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575
(1977).
236 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. d (1995).
237 Zacchini, 433 U.S at 575.
238 See supra notes 161-65.
239 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575.
240 See supra note 237.
241 Zacchini, 433 U.S at 575.
242 A licensing market is similar to a derivative, which is a competing substitute for an
original work, or identity, in a marketplace that deprives the original owner of significant
revenue. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 223 (2d Cir. 2015). In this example,
the misappropriation of Zacchini’s entire performance created a competing substitute that
inhibited Zacchini’s ability to raise revenue in the marketplace for his performance.
243 Zacchini, 433 U.S at 575.
234
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misappropriated version broadcasted by the defendant without ever
obtaining Zacchini’s permission, thus causing commercial injury in a
licensing market. 244 Moreover, under this factor, as demonstrated by
Zacchini, the plaintiff is entitled not only to protection from lost profits
from his performance and lost licensing opportunities, but also to
recover for the commercial value that his performance provided the
news program. 245
B.

A Fifth Factor

The Lanham Act has been coined the federal equivalent of state
law right of publicity. 246 For this reason, celebrities often couple their
right of publicity violation claim with a claim for a violation under the
Lanham Act Section 43(a). 247 The premise of a claim under the
Lanham Act is to protect against use of a celebrity’s identity that is
unauthorized and likely to falsely imply celebrity endorsement or
support. 248 Courts have considered implementing a likelihood of
confusion test in right of publicity actions, but have expressed
concerns to having it be the sole decisive test. 249 While on its own, the
likelihood of confusion test could be insufficient to adequately balance
the competing right of publicity and First Amendment protections,250
utilizing the test as a factor in an affirmative defense both exploits the
advantages of the test while simultaneously diminishing the
disadvantages. 251 Additionally, this factor incorporates the important
principle that a defendant should not be permitted to unduly benefit
from the confusion caused to consumers by the use of the celebrity’s

244

Id.
Id.
246 Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 57 (2006).
247 See, e.g., White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1992)
(plaintiff brought an action for a violation of her right of publicity and the Lanham Act);
Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff
brought the action alleging violation of his right of publicity and the Lanham Act).
248 Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 57.
249 Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that the approach
“ignores the fact that the artistic work is not simply a commercial product but is also a means
of communication.”); Id. (finding an unmodified likelihood of confusion approach inadequate
to account for the full weight of the public’s interest in free expression).
250 Id.
251 See supra notes 78-81.
245
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identity in the work. 252 It also fosters the dual interest of consumers to
not be misled by the creator, and to enjoy the product of the creator’s
ability to exercise freedom of expression.253 Moreover, the concerns
some courts expressed regarding the application of this test to right of
publicity actions 254 are effectively eliminated because the likelihood of
confusion test is no longer dispositive, and will be weighed with the
other four factors.
1.

Likelihood of Confusion

This factor is taken from the part of the Lanham Act 255 which
was discussed in the analysis of the Rogers’ Lanham Act test. 256 As
mentioned in Section V. Part B, celebrities often couple their state law
right of publicity violation claim with a claim for violation under the
federal Lanham Act § 43(a). Grounded on the similarities of the claims
under both state and federal law, 257 this factor incorporates the
important considerations of the Lanham Act test 258 and converts them
into a separate factor to be used in the Right of Publicity Defense.
This factor considers whether the use of the celebrity’s identity
“is likely to cause confusion or to cause mistake, or deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with, or as to
origin, sponsorship, or approval of” 259 the work. The question under
this factor is whether the use of the celebrity’s identity in the work
would cause an individual to believe that the celebrity is somehow
affiliated with or behind the work. 260 The factor effectively eliminates
the problem that existed with the Rogers’ test 261 because it incorporates
252

See supra notes 78-81.
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989).
254 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 158 (3d Cir. 2013) (suggesting the weakness of
applying the Rogers’ trademark-based test to right of publicity actions without accounting for
the difference).
255 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
256 See supra notes 68-71.
257 See supra notes 247-48.
258 See supra notes 68-71.
259 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(a).
260 See infra notes 290-95. The question in Brown was whether the people who play
Madden NFL would believe that Brown was behind or sponsored the game. Brown v. Elecs.
Arts, Inc., 2009 WL 8763151, *5.
261 See supra notes 78-81 (The problem with the Rogers’ test is that it mirrors the Lanham
Act which requires a showing of a likelihood of consumer confusion while the right of
publicity requires no such finding). This comment argues that if the defendant in a right of
publicity action can prove that the likelihood of consumer confusion is insignificant, then the
253
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the likelihood of confusion requirement into the new Right of Publicity
Defense analysis. Finding a likelihood of confusion is no longer
considered dispositive and instead will weigh towards right of
publicity protection. 262
Although the First Amendment guarantees freedom of
expression, 263 no one has a constitutional right to use a celebrity’s
identity without his permission to draw attention to their creation or
help sell a product. 264 A work that causes confusion regarding the
celebrity’s participation or endorsement of a work will receive less
protection under the First Amendment. 265 Thus, the fifth factor must
evaluate the relevance of the celebrity’s identity to the artistic value of
the work. 266 The use of a celebrity’s identity in a work that has no
artistic relevance whatsoever can implicitly cause a likelihood of
confusion as to the endorsement or approval of the work by the
celebrity, and therefore cannot be justified as an interest in freedom of
expression because the use of the identity provides no artistic value to
the work. 267 The irrelevant use of a celebrity’s identity in a work can
lead a consumer to believe the celebrity has something to do with the
work, because for what other reason would the celebrity’s identity be
used if it is neither artistically relevant, nor an endorsement. 268
Therefore, if there is no artistic relevance at all, this factor will weigh
against fair use because of the confusion that the use of the celebrity’s
identity in the work will likely cause consumers. Additionally, even

factor should weigh in the creator’s favor and lean towards a finding of fair use. Unlike in the
Rogers’ test, the fact that someone is likely to be confused by a creator’s work does not
automatically infringe upon a celebrity’s right of publicity. Instead, it is a factor to be weighed
with the other factors under this test.
262 While the right of publicity does not require a showing of confusion, when claiming this
defense, a defendant who can show there is no likelihood of confusion will be afforded greater
protection. MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 2:4.
263 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
264 MCCARTHY, supra note 12, at § 7:3
265 Id.
266 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989).
267 See, e.g., id. at 999 (stating that “a misleading title with no artistic relevance cannot be
sufficiently justified by a free expression interest.”).
268 See id. (if the film-maker used the title with no artistic relevance at all, the confusing
suggestions as to the source implicitly conveyed would violate the Lanham Act). Even if an
artist claims that the use of the celebrity’s identity is symbolic, the question of artistic
relevance remains. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 454 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasizing
that “crying symbol” does not change the question of artistic relevance and automatically
confer authority to use a celebrity’s identity).
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when there is a finding of artistic relevance, if the work is explicitly
misleading or confusing to consumers, the factor will also weigh
against a finding of fair use. 269 For example, in Michael Jordan v.
Jewel Food Stores, Inc. & Super Valu, Inc., 270 the court recognized that
Jewel Food Store’s use of the image of Jordan sneakers, on a page that
also contained the store’s trademarked logo and slogan, was relevant
because it was placed in a commemorative book praising Michael
Jordan. 271 However, the court also found that Jewel Food Store used
the image with the specific intent to advertise its store, and recognized
that a reader could easily mistake the advertisement as an endorsement
by Jordan. 272 Therefore, this use violated Jordan’s right of publicity, 273
and under this factor would weigh against a finding of fair use.
Furthermore, when the use of a celebrity’s identity in a work
falls somewhere between these two ends of the spectrum, and is found
to have at least some artistic relevance and is not explicitly for the
purpose of confusing consumers, the interest in the First Amendment
free expression clause will outweigh the right of publicity
protection. 274 When the use of a celebrity’s identity in a work might
suggest that the celebrity had some sort of role in its production or
endorsement, even if this suggestion is false, as long as the identity is
in some way relevant to the artistic value of the work, the factor will
weigh towards a finding of fair use. 275 Therefore, under this factor,
when the use of a celebrity’s identity is at least slightly relevant to the
artistic value of the work, and the use does not explicitly mislead the
consumer as to the content of the work, the factor will lean towards a
finding of fair use and not towards right of publicity protection. 276 For
example, in Rogers v. Grimaldi, although the title of the film was the
269

Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. (stating that even where a title has minimal artistic relevance
but is explicitly misleading as to the source, a Lanham Act violation can be found).
270 Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc. & Super Valu, Inc., WL 12-1992, *3 (2014).
271 Jordan v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 743 F.3d 509, 512 (7th Cir. 2014).
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1000.
275 Id. (emphasizing that “the slight risk that such use of a celebrity’s name might implicitly
suggest endorsement or sponsorship to some people is outweighed by the danger of restricting
expression”). See, e.g., Estate of Hemingway v. Random House Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 350
(1968) (holding that the estate of Ernest Hemingway had no cause of action for unfair
competition based on likelihood of confusion against the author of a biographical memoir
entitled “Papa Hemingway.”).
276 This factor utilizes the Rogers’ test, but instead of a dispositive result under the test, it
will weigh as a factor in an overall affirmative defense.
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exact name of two famous dancers, the court found that because the
title was artistically relevant to the characters in the film, and was not
explicitly misleading, the title was not a violation of Rogers’ right of
publicity. 277 Thus, under this factor the use of the names in the title of
the film would lean towards a finding of fair use. Moreover, this factor
mirrors the Rogers’ Lanham Act test 278 formulated by the Second
Circuit. The only difference is that this test is now a factor instead of
a dispositive test, and therefore it must be weighed with the other four
factors of the Right of Publicity Defense.
The court in Brown v. Elecs. Arts, Inc., 279 was influential in
evaluating the likelihood of confusion for the use of a celebrity’s
identity in an artistic work. In that case, James “Jim” Brown, a retired
professional football player, brought an action against Electronic Arts,
Inc., (EA), 280 creator of the “Madden NFL” video game series, alleging
the unauthorized use of his identity in the video game. 281 Brown sued
under the Lanham Act, 282 similar to the action brought in Rogers v.
Grimaldi, 283 and EA argued that the First Amendment provided a
complete defense to the alleged Lanham Act violation. 284
In its analysis, the court applied the Rogers’ Lanham Act test
to determine whether the use of Brown’s identity was protected under
the First Amendment, 285 and determined that there was no remedy for
Brown under the Lanham Act. 286 Moreover, most relevant to the
analysis of this new factor, the court evaluated whether the use of
Brown’s identity in the game was misleading to the consumer. 287 First,
the court recognized that a Rogers’ Lanham Act claim will only
277 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001. The title refers directly to the film’s main characters who are
known to the audience by the names “Ginger and Fred.” Id.
278 See supra notes 68-71.
279 2009 WL 8763151.
280 “EA develops and publishes [various] video games including Madden NFL.” Id. at 1.
281 Id. Each of the games in the series contained up to 170 teams and around 1,500 players.
The virtual players in the games reflected the real-life players in the NFL, and wore their
names and numbers while competing in the virtual games. Id.
282 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (liability for “any person who on or in connection with any goods
or services … uses in commerce any word … or any false designation of origin, or any false
misleading description of fact.”).
283 See supra notes 63-65.
284 Brown, 2009 WL 8763151 at *2.
285 Id. at *3.
286 Id. at *5 (holding that where there was no consumer confusion, and because of important
First Amendment interests, there was no remedy under the Lanham Act).
287 Id.
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succeed if “the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion
outweighs the public interest in free expression.” 288 Applying the twopronged Rogers’ Lanham Act test 289 the court recognized that the first
step is finding that the use of the celebrity’s identity in a work is
relevant to the work itself. 290 The threshold of relevance is particularly
low, and must “merely be above zero.” 291 Under this first prong, the
court determined that the use of Brown’s image in Madden NFL was
not irrelevant. 292 Madden NFL is a video game about NFL Football,
and Brown is a legendary NFL football player; therefore, the use is
undoubtedly relevant. 293
The second step is to determine whether the use of the
celebrity’s identity “explicitly misleads consumers as to the source or
content of the work.” 294 Under this second prong, the court determined
that consumers were not likely to believe that Brown was “somehow
behind the game or sponsors the product.” 295 It reasoned that because
Brown’s identity was only utilized in one of the thousands of virtual
players in the game, 296 and because to conclude that this one player
signified Brown’s endorsement would require a “leap of logic,”297
there was not a likelihood of consumer confusion. The court
emphasized that the “mere presence” 298 in an artistic work does not
automatically constitute a finding of a likelihood of confusion. 299
Thus, the court held that even when looking at the facts in a light most

288

Brown, 2009 WL 8763151 at *3.
See supra notes 68-71.
290 Brown, 2009 WL 8763151 at *3.
291 Id.
292 Id. at *4.
293 Id.
294 Id. at *5.
295 Brown, 2009 WL 8763151 at *5.
296 Id.
297 Id. (stating that “it would require a leap of logic to conclude that the player’s presence
in the games equates to Brown’s endorsement of the games.”).
298 Id. (emphasizing that the player’s mere presence in Madden NFL does not constitute
endorsement); see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (stressing that
mere inclusion of a celebrity identity in a work does not satisfy the likelihood of confusion
prong of the test).
299 Brown, 2009 WL 8763151 at *5 (stating that “EA’s use of Brown’s identity could not
constitute an explicit attempt to signify that Brown endorsed the games.”).
289
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favorable to Brown, First Amendment freedom of expression protected
EA’s use of Brown’s identity in the video game. 300
This Brown likelihood of confusion analysis 301 provides a
compelling example of the steps that must occur during the
examination of a claim under this fifth factor. The inquiry to the
likelihood of confusion must be two-fold. 302 First, the court must
determine whether the use of the celebrity’s identity is relevant to the
work at issue. 303 Second, the court must determine whether the use of
the celebrity’s identity “explicitly misleads consumers as to the source
of the work,” 304 to the extent that the public interest in avoiding this
confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression. 305 Thus, if
the court finds that the likelihood of consumer confusion outweighs
the public interest in freedom of expression, this factor will weigh
towards right of publicity protection.
Therefore, in accordance with the court’s analysis in Brown,
which determined that there was not a likelihood of confusion, 306 under
the fifth factor in the new Right of Publicity Defense, the use of
Brown’s identity in the work would lean towards a finding of fair use.
VI.

JUSTIFYING THE NEED FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
DEFENSE

To exemplify the benefits and the correct use of this proposed
Right of Publicity Defense, this Section will discuss and apply the
defense to two recent and similar decisions decided by the Third and
Ninth Circuits in 2013. 307 Similar to Brown, 308 the cases involve star
collegiate athletes, who brought actions against EA alleging violations
300 Id. This result is consistent with the holding in Rogers, which found that the title of the
movie was protected by the First Amendment, and the mere use of the name did not equate to
a right of publicity violation. Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1000.
301 See supra notes 288-99.
302 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1100.
303 See supra notes 290-97.
304 See supra note 294.
305 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001 (recognizing that even when there is risk that a consumer might
be confused as to endorsement, this risk must outweigh the public interest in artistic
expression).
306 Brown v. Elecs. Arts, Inc., 2009 WL 8763151 at *5.
307 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d
1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
308 2009 WL 8763151.
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of their rights of publicity by EA for its use of their identities in the
characters in the video game series “NCAA Football.” 309
The Circuit Courts in both cases utilized the transformative use
test to reach their decisions. 310 Each court emphasized that not only
were the characters in the video games closely identical in physical
characteristics to the famous college athletes, 311 but the characters
were also used in the exact context the athletes were found in real life
– famous student-athletes playing football in football stadiums. 312
Currently, these cases yield corresponding conclusions as a
result of the transformative use test applied in the decisions. 313 Both
courts determined that the former college athletes are entitled to right
of publicity protection. 314 Moreover, as previously mentioned, the
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of the First Amendment in
the right of publicity context since Zacchini in 1977, 315 and
subsequently there has been vigorous expansion of the right of
publicity, 316 with various courts attempting to balance these two
important rights. 317 Thus, although multiple circuits have applied and
adopted the transformative use test, 318 including the Third and Ninth
Circuits, 319 the test has not been unanimously adopted for all right of
publicity cases which require a balancing of the First Amendment.320
However, some of the decisions adopting the transformative use test,
including the Third Circuit decision in Hart, 321 and the Ninth Circuit
decision in Keller, 322 also contained stimulating dissenting opinions,
which criticized the majority’s decision to use or apply the
309

Hart, 717 F.3d at 146-47; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271.
Hart, 717 F.3d at 163; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276.
311 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (noting that the video game avatar matched Hart in physical
features as well as accessories worn while he played at Rutgers); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276.
312 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (emphasizing that the Keller video game
avatar was a college football player in the “identical setting to where the public found [Keller]
in his collegiate career: on the football field.”).
313 Hart, 717 F.3d at 170; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279.
314 Hart, 717 F.3d at 170; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279.
315 Hart, 717 F.3d at 152 (stating that “Zacchini is the only Supreme Court case addressing
the First Amendment in a right of publicity context.”).
316 See supra notes 41-46.
317 See supra Section III.
318 Hart, 717 F.3d at 163; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276.
319 Hart, 717 F.3d at 163; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276.
320 Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (applying the predominant
use test); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying the Rogers test).
321 Hart, 717 F.3d at 170 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
322 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1284 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
310
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transformative use test. 323 Notably, the dissenting judges in Hart and
Keller both criticized the majority’s application of the transformative
use test. 324
As emphasized by these dissenting judges, the Circuit Courts’
decisions in Hart and Keller were motivated by fears of extensive
misappropriation. 325 While applying the transformative use test, the
Ninth Circuit expressed its wariness of “cynical abuse” by video game
companies if it decided to recognize the true creative and
transformative nature of the interactive functions in NCAA Football
and other video games. 326 The courts did not want the balancing tests
to weigh against right of publicity protections merely because the
works in question contained “highly creative elements in
abundance.” 327 While these admonitions are significant, the proposed
Right of Publicity Defense would adequately combat this fear of
blatant misappropriation. 328 Specifically in this instance, the majority
in both Hart and Keller would have been able to recognize the creative
and transformative elements in the video games, as was intended by
the transformative use test, 329 because the proposed test’s four
additional factors would adequately safeguard against any blatant
misappropriation. 330 Thus, the majority’s cautionary approach in both
323 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Company, 332 F.3d 915, 960 (6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the majority should have applied the test derived in Rogers to correctly
balance the rights).
324 Hart, 717 F.3d at 173 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that confining the inquiry to
the identity alone is flawed, and that “the whole – the aggregate of many parts (including, here,
many people)– is the better baseline for [the transformative use] inquiry.”); see also Keller,
724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that “the salient question is whether the
entire work is transformative, and whether an individual persona or image has been altered.”).
325 Hart, 717 F.3d at 167 (warning that recognizing the interactive feature as influentially
transformative could lead to blatant acts of misappropriation, easily protected by including a
modification feature).
326 Id.
327 Hart, 717 F.3d at 169 (warning that if not properly considered “acts of blatant
misappropriation would count for nothing so long as the larger work, on balance, contained
high creative elements in great abundance.”).
328 See infra notes 329-30.
329 See Comedy III Prodc., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 25 Cal. 4th 387, 404 (2001)
(emphasizing that the transformative use test was formulated from the first factor of the
copyright fair use doctrine). The first factor of the copyright fair use doctrine determines
“whether the new work merely supersedes the objects of the original creation, or whether and
to what extent it is “transformative,” altering the original with new expression, meaning, or
message.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
330 The dissenting opinions in both Keller and Hart criticize the majority for straying from
this intended application of the transformative use test as a result of the fear of blatant
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Hart and Keller reiterates the need for a test that will effectively
balance the First Amendment and right of publicity protections with
the utmost fairness.
A.

Applying the Right of Publicity Defense

Applying the new Right of Publicity Defense to the Hart and
Keller cases affords a firm example of the effectiveness of this new
test for right of publicity cases.
The first factor looks to the nature of the use. 331 EA’s use of
Hart and Keller’s identities in NCAA Football clearly does not fall
within the categories of criticism, teaching, or research, 332 and
therefore the determination should focus on the degree to which the
use is transformative. 333 In both Hart and Keller, contrary to the
majority decisions which found that EA’s use of Hart and Keller’s
identities was not transformative, 334 this first factor finds that EA’s use
is transformative 335 and weighs towards a finding of fair use.
The majority opinions in both Hart and Keller restrict their
analysis to the individual avatar in the video game alone, 336 and fail to
recognize the transformative elements throughout the entire game.337
In harmony with the dissenting judges in Hart and Keller, this factor
considers the transformative elements of a work in its entirety, 338
misappropriation and inadequate protection of the right of publicity. Hart, 717 F.3d at 172
(Ambro, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the majority decision shifted away from the
traditional transformative use analysis); see also infra notes 349-82 (weighing the remaining
four factors to ensure that a celebrity’s identity is adequately protected from any blatant
misappropriation that would exploit the celebrity’s efforts to achieve his famed identity or
misuse the commercial value of a celebrity’s identity without his permission).
331 This factor will refer to the reasoning of the district court decision in Hart, because for
determination of transformative use, this factor reflects the views of the dissenting judges in
Hart and Keller and requires that the entire work as a whole be considered, just as the district
court did in Hart.
332 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“The fair use of a copyrighted work … for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”).
333 See supra notes 180-84.
334 Hart, 717 F.3d at 170; Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1279 (9th Cir. 2013).
335 See infra notes 342-45.
336 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (emphasizing that the digital avatar of Hart in the game was almost
identical to Hart’s identity in real life, and therefore determining how the identity was
incorporated into the game did not matter); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276.
337 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276.
338 Hart, 717 F.3d at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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including consideration of the purpose of a work, 339 and analyzes how
a celebrity’s identity has been transformed and incorporated into a
work as a whole. 340
Although the identities of both Hart and Keller in the games are
actual imitations of the individuals, the entire use of the characters
within the games as a whole is transformative. 341 The video games
convey the artistic expressions of EA’s design team through the
games’ graphics and sounds, characters, including characters that are
not football players, commentary, and game scenarios. 342 EA also
created the interactive ability that gives users a chance to embark on
their own narrative, allowing them to control the players and teams
through multiple seasons. 343 Moreover, the use of this mechanism that
grants the gamer a high level of control in the interaction of the game,
including the ability to adjust the characters and gaming atmosphere in
various different ways, 344 demonstrates that the use is
transformative. 345
Additionally, NCAA Football has a transformative purpose to
provide a realistic gaming experience to its users. 346 This purpose adds
something new to the identities of Keller and Hart, altering them to fit
the interactive objective of the game. 347 Moreover, EA’s commercial
benefit derives from the user’s desire to play the entire video game as
339

Hart, 717 F.3d at 170 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
Hart, 717 F.3d at 172 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that to limit the inquiry to
likeness alone is at odds with previous Supreme Court decisions on the transformative use
test).
341 Hart, 717 F.3d at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that realistic, interactive
gaming experience as a whole transforms Hart’s individual image); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1288
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (stressing that “only when the creative work is considered in complete
context can a proper analysis be conducted.”).
342 Hart, 717 F.3d at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
343 Id.
344 Keller, 724 F.3d at 1286 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the gamer can change the
“abilities, appearances, and physical characteristics,” as well as control the “weather, crowd
noise, mascots, and other environmental factors.”).
345 Id. The majority disagreed with this and dismissed the notion that the interactive feature
of the video game contributed to the transformative use of the football player’s image. Hart,
717 F.3d at 166. The majority feared that recognizing the transformative nature of this feature
would open the door to blatant acts of misappropriation by video game companies. Id.
346 Hart, 717 F.3d at 170 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (recognizing that a key to the success of
NCAA Football is “consumers’ desire to experience a realistic football playing experience
with their favorite teams.”).
347 See Author’s Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 221 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing
that unchanged copying is permitted where a further purpose is found).
340
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a whole, and not solely from the use of either Hart’s or Keller’s identity
in the game. 348 Therefore the commercial value comes from the new
creation of the interactive game and not from the use of the identities
of Hart or Keller. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of EA and a finding
of fair use.
The second factor is determined by examining the effort a
celebrity exercised to establish his famous identity. 349 This is
measured by whether the publicity was earned or incidental. 350 In both
Hart and Keller, the football players are classified as achieving earned
publicity. The hard work and dedication each famous collegiate
athlete devoted to the sport allowed him to excel in college football,351
and ultimately was the reason his identity was placed in the video game
in the first place. Therefore, this factor weighs against finding fair use
and instead toward the protection of Hart’s and Keller’s right of
publicity.
The third factor analyzes the extent of the misappropriation by
considering the entire work as a whole in comparison to the celebrity’s
identity. 352 Thus, when applying this factor to both Hart and Keller
the factor considers the extent of the misappropriation with respect to
the video games in their entirety. The majority opinions in both Hart
and Keller are most influential with respect to this factor. These
opinions focused on the identities of Hart and Keller compared to the
virtual characters and the setting of the games. 353 As emphasized in
these two opinions, the identities of both Hart and Keller in NCAA
Football were realistic portrayals of real life. 354 Moreover, the context
of the avatars encompassing Hart’s and Keller’s identities in the video
game was the exact context that Hart and Keller were in as collegiate

348

Hart, 717 F.3d at 170.
See supra notes 198-99.
350 Id.
351 Ryan Hart Stats, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/college-football/player/stats/_/id/135377/
ryan-hart (last visited Mar. 7, 2017); Sam Keller Profile, SUN DEVIL ATHLETICS,
http://www.thesundevils.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=30300&
ATCLID=208250752 (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
352 See supra notes 219-23.
353 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166; Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013).
354 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (noting that the avatar matched Hart in physical features as well
as accessories worn while he played at Rutgers); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (recognizing that
the video game character was an almost identical replication of Keller in real life, who is
represented as “what he was: the starting quarterback for Arizona State”).
349
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athletes, playing football in football stadiums.355 Thus, under this
factor, the quantity of the misappropriation of both Hart and Keller is
very great. Although EA argued that NCAA Football contains many
creative and interactive elements and thus was not strictly a replication
of Hart’s and Keller’s identities, 356 with respect to quantity, the game
misappropriated both Hart’s and Keller’s entire identities. 357
Arguably, had EA chosen to alter the identities of Hart and
Keller in the games, creating either unique characteristics or settings,
the quantity of the misappropriation would not be so great. For
example, in Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc. 358 the avatar in the game,
although evidencing certain similarities, was not a literal depiction of
Kirby. 359 The avatar was created with several unique characteristics,
and was in a mystical space-age setting, and thus was not a
misappropriation of the celebrity’s identity. 360 Under this factor, had
EA manipulated the images of Hart and Keller, or changed the setting
in which these identities were found, similar to Sega of America, the
quantity of the misappropriation would be low. However, because the
avatars embodying Hart’s and Keller’s identities were realistic
portrayals of real life, 361 found in the exact setting as real life, 362 the
misappropriation is very great. Therefore, this factor will weigh
against a finding of fair use and instead towards a right of publicity
protection.
355 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (noting that “the digital Ryan Hart does what the actual Ryan Hart
did while at Rutgers: he plays college football, in digital recreations of college football
stadiums”); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (recognizing that the virtual character of Keller
performed the exact activity he was known for in the game’s setting which “is identical to
where the public found [Keller] during his college career”).
356 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276.
357 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276.
358 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (2006).
359 Id. at 59.
360 Id. (emphasizing that the fictional space setting and role of the character in the game as
a space-age reporter in the 21st century was not a misappropriation of the celebrity who was
actually a famous singer).
361 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (noting that the avatar matched Hart in physical features as well
as accessories worn while he played at Rutgers); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (recognizing that
the video game character was an almost identical replication of Keller in real life, who is
represented as “what he was: the starting quarterback for Arizona State”).
362 Hart, 717 F.3d at 166 (noting that “the digital Ryan Hart does what the actual Ryan Hart
did while at Rutgers: he plays college football, in digital recreations of college football
stadiums”); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1276 (recognizing that the virtual character of Keller
performed the exact activity he was known for in the game’s setting which “is identical to
where the public found [Keller] during his college career”).
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The fourth factor applied to both Hart and Keller will weigh
towards a finding of fair use. This factor considers the effect the use
of the celebrity’s identity has on the potential market in light of the
creative elements of defendant’s use. Notably, the NCAA’s
amateurism rules restrict the ability of student-athletes to enter into
licenses with outside companies while they are players in the
NCAA. 363 Thus, because of this restriction, neither Hart nor Keller
would have been permitted to license his identity to EA during his time
as a student-athlete. However, even if these restrictions are set
aside, 364 when the use of these celebrities’ identities is viewed in light
of the creative elements of NCAA Football, this factor will weigh
towards a finding of fair use. NCAA Football, in addition to the
identities of Hart and Keller, contained many creative and interactive
elements. 365 Unlike in Zacchini, where the celebrity’s entire
performance was taken and broadcasted identically to how it was
performed, 366 EA added various creative features to NCAA Football
while simultaneously misappropriating the celebrities’ identities.367
Thus, under this factor the commercial harm to Hart and Keller is less
extensive because of the creative and interactive features added to their
identities.
Notably, EA is also the creator of several video games based
on professional sports and athletes. 368 EA adequately compensates the
professional athletes whose identities are utilized as a basis for the
avatars in these video games. 369 Thus arguably, with NCAA
363

Amateurism, NCAA (Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism; see also Hart,
717 F.3d at 146 (recognizing that the NCAA bi-laws prohibit the athlete from using his athletic
skills for pay in the sport, or permits his name or picture to advertise or promote a product in
any way).
364 The NCAA bi-laws, including the amateurism restrictions, are a completely separate and
complex topic, and therefore for the purposes of this note will not be discussed in detail.
365 Hart, 717 F.3d at 146 (noting that NCAA Football allows a player to choose the football
teams to play in a stadium filled with coaches, referees, mascots, cheerleaders and fans, and
allows the player to control the game for multiple seasons).
366 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575 (1977).
367 Hart, 717 F.3d at 175 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that realistic, interactive
gaming experience as a whole transforms Hart’s individual image); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1286
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the gamer can change the “abilities, appearances, and
physical characteristics,” as well as control the “weather, crowd noise, mascots, and other
environmental factors.”).
368 See Latest Games, EA SPORTS, https://www.ea.com/games (last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
369 See, e.g., EA & FIFA – Licensing Agreement Extended Until 2022, EA SPORTS (May 8,
2013),
https://www.easports.com/fifa/news/2013/ea-sports-and-fifa-extend-licensingagreement-until-2022.
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amateurism rules 370 set aside, Hart and Keller lost the ability to license
their identities to EA for use in NCAA Football and receive
compensation similar to that of professional athletes. 371 However, this
factor considers the effect the use of the celebrity’s identity has on the
potential market in light of the creative elements of the defendant’s
use. 372 Therefore, under this factor, the potential market is considered
broadly in light of NCAA Football’s various creative elements.373
Thus, the numerous other licensing opportunities available to both Hart
and Keller must also be considered. 374 Both Hart and Keller can
license their identities for use in other video games, commercials, or to
other industries seeking to use their identities for endorsement or
creative purposes. 375 Therefore, under this factor, the interest of free
expression outweighs the slight harm 376 that arguably occurred to the
plaintiffs’ licensing opportunities in the market of video games,
specifically the NCAA Football series, and this factor will weigh
towards a finding of fair use.
The fifth and final factor determines whether there is a
likelihood of confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the
work by determining the relevance of the celebrity’s identity to the
artistic value of the work, and the likelihood of consumer confusion.377
Both Hart and Keller are similar to Brown v. Elecs. Arts, Inc. 378 In that
case the court found that there was no likelihood of confusion for the
use of Brown’s image by EA in its video game series Madden Football.

370

See supra note 363.
See supra note 369.
372 See supra note 367.
373 Id.
374 Celebrities can license their identity, or even appear personally, in commercials and
advertisements for various products including: food, clothing, technology, sports drinks, etc.
See Celebrity Endorsements, ADWEEK, http://www.adweek.com/topic/celebrity-endorsements
(last visited Mar. 7, 2017).
375 Id.
376 As a result of the NCAA amateurism requirements, college football players are not
permitted to be compensated for the use their identities in video games. In contrast, EA
compensates the college athletes’ celebrity counterparts for the use of their identities in video
games. However, student-athletes in the NCAA forfeit their ability to receive compensation
by agreeing to the amateurism requirements and contracting with the NCAA. See supra note
363.
377 See supra notes 255-58.
378 2009 WL 8763151.
371
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The court’s analysis in Brown, 379 applied to both Keller and Hart,
yields the same conclusion.
First, the use of Hart’s and Keller’s image in the game does
have artistic relevance to the game itself: the game is designed to
provide a virtual college football experience, and they are both college
football stars. 380 Second, as noted in Brown, it is very unlikely that an
individual playing the game, which has over 1,500 players, would
assume that the use of either Hart’s or Keller’s identity for one of the
virtual players represents their sponsorship or creation of the game. 381
Thus, under this two-pronged analysis, there is no likelihood of
confusion.
Arguably, while the First Amendment guarantees a freedom of
expression, it does not grant someone a constitutionally protected right
to use a celebrity’s identity without his permission to draw attention to
a creation or help sell a product. 382 In both Hart and Keller it appears
that this is precisely what EA intended by using Hart’s and Keller’s
image in the video games. 383 However, under this likelihood of
confusion factor, a celebrity will only be successful when the public
interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest
in free expression. 384 Under this two-pronged analysis, if EA’s use
was determined to cause a likelihood of consumer confusion, the
public interest in avoiding this confusion would outweigh the public
interest in free expression, and thus the factor would lead towards a
right of publicity protection. However, this analysis concludes that
there is no likelihood of consumer confusion. 385 Therefore this fifth
factor in both Hart and Keller will lean towards a finding of fair use.
Furthermore, the application of the new Right of Publicity
Defense to both Hart and Keller leans towards a finding of fair use

379

See supra notes 288-99.
Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141,158 (3d Cir. 2013) (recognizing that “[g]iven that
appellant played intercollegiate football, however, products targeting the sports-fan market
would, as a matter of course, relate to him.”).
381 Brown, 2009 WL 8763151 at *5 (noting that Brown’s identity was used in only one of
the thousands of virtual athletes in the games). Similarly, Keller and Hart’s identities are used
in only one of the thousands of athletes in the NCAA Football gaming series. See also Hart v.
Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d at 174 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (finding that Hart’s image in the game
does not mislead the public to believe he was the source of the game).
382 MCCARTHY, supra note 12 at § 7:3.
383 Hart, 717 F.3d at 146-47; Keller v. Elec. Arts Inc., 724 F.3d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013).
384 Brown, 2009 WL 8763151 at *3.
385 See supra notes 380-81.
380
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because three out of five of the factors favor fair use. 386 The protection
of EA’s First Amendment free expression rights trumps the right of
publicity protections of both Hart and Keller. Thus, under this new
approach, the decisions in both Hart and Keller, in contrast to the
actual decisions, 387 would both conclude that EA’s use of the plaintiffs’
images in the NCAA Football game series constitutes a fair use that is
protected by the First Amendment.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, this proposed Right of Publicity Defense should
be adopted as the balancing test to be used uniformly throughout all
the circuits. The importance of balancing the right of publicity and
First Amendment protections has been recognized since Zacchini, and
balancing the rights has proven to be a frustrating task. This test
resolves the problems of the existing balancing tests by incorporating
them as factors to be weighed together. It provides a clear standard
that ensures that the right of publicity remains protected without
hindering creativity and the freedom of expression.

386
387

See supra Section VI.
Hart, 717 F.3d at 170; Keller, 724 F.3d at 1279.
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